William LaFuze and Michael Valek of Vinson & Elkins write in an article titled, "In re Seagate: Rethinking Waiver of Privilege and the Future of the Affirmative Duty of Care" in the print edition of the American Bar Association's Section of Intellectual Property Law's IPL Newsletter (the electronic version will ultimately appear here):
Reliance on an opinion of counsel, the traditional - and still most common - defense to a charge of willful patent infringement, is an increasingly risky strategy for accused infringers. A well-reasoned opinion detailing why the patent at issue is not infringed, not valid, or not enforceable remains a powerful defense to willfulness. But reliance on such an opinion, that is, assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense, is a two-edged sword. When the advice-of-counsel defense is asserted, privilege with respect to that opinion is waived. Both opinion counsel and the client are subject to being deposed regarding the subject matter of the opinion. Moreover, that subject matter waiver typically involves noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability defenses - defenses that are usually the very heart of the accused infringer's case. Most troubling of all is that courts are increasingly prone to rule that the subject matter waiver extends also to communications with and the work product of trial counsel - even in those situations where opinion counsel and trial counsel are different lawyers at separate law firms.
District courts are increasingly relying on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Echostar to hold that the subject matter waiver resulting from assertion of an advice-of-counsel defense extends to trial counsel.
In re Seagate stems from a petition seeking mandamus relief from an order of the district court for the Southern District of New York requiring the accused infringer to produce documents reflecting communications with and the work product of trial counsel.
The Federal Circuit decided sua sponte to consider that petition en banc, and on January 26, 2007, issued an order requesting additional briefing on three questions:
- Should a party's assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense to willful infringement extend waiver of the attorney-client privilege to communications with that party's trial counsel?
- What is the effect of any such waiver on work-product immunity?
- Given the impact of the statutory duty of care standard announced in Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983) on the issue of waiver of attorney-client privilege, should this court reconsider the decision in Underwater Devices and the duty of care standard itself?
The briefing in Seagate and argument were complete prior to submission of the article for publication, but the Federal Circuit just issued its opinion on Monday, August 20, 2007. The opinion states, in part:
Seagate Technology, LLC (“Seagate”) petitions for a writ of mandamus directing the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to vacate its orders compelling disclosure of materials and testimony that Seagate claims is covered by the attorney-client privilege and work product protection. We ordered en banc review, and now grant the petition. We overrule Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (1983), and we clarify the scope of the waiver of attorney-client privilege and work product protection that results when an accused patent infringer asserts an advice of counsel defense to a charge of willful infringement.
A party seeking a writ of mandamus bears the burden of proving that it has no other means of attaining the relief desired, Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989), and that the right to issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable,” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980). In appropriate cases, a writ of mandamus may issue “to prevent the wrongful exposure of privileged communications.” In re Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Specifically, “mandamus review may be granted of discovery orders that turn on claims of privilege when (1) there is raised an important issue of first impression, (2) the privilege would be lost if review were denied until final judgment, and (3) immediate resolution would avoid the development of doctrine that would undermine the privilege.” Id. at 1388. This case meets these criteria.
In light of the duty of due care, accused willful infringers commonly assert an advice of counsel defense. Under this defense, an accused willful infringer aims to establish that due to reasonable reliance on advice from counsel, its continued accused activities were done in good faith. Typically, counsel’s opinion concludes that the patent is invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed. Although an infringer’s reliance on favorable advice of counsel, or conversely his failure to proffer any favorable advice, is not dispositive of the willfulness inquiry, it is crucial to the analysis. E.g., Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis., Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Possession of a favorable opinion of counsel is not essential to avoid a willfulness determination; it is only one factor to be considered, albeit an important one.”).
In sum, we hold, as a general proposition, that asserting the advice of counsel defense and disclosing opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for communications with trial counsel. We do not purport to set out an absolute rule. Instead, trial courts remain free to exercise their discretion in unique circumstances to extend waiver to trial counsel, such as if a party or counsel engages in chicanery. We believe this view comports with Supreme Court precedent, which has made clear that rules concerning privileges are subject to review and revision, when necessary. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9 (noting that federal courts are “to ‘continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges.’” (quoting Trammel, 445 U.S. at 47)).
Accordingly, Seagate’s petition for a writ of mandamus is granted, and the district court will reconsider its discovery orders in light of this opinion.
I encourage you to get a copy of Mr. LaFuze and Mr. Valek's article and read it in conjunction with the Court's opinion.